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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

DAILY DIGEST

APR 26 1951

NOTE:

- 1. This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence.
- Comments represent the preliminary views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
- 3. Marginal letter indications are defined as follows:
 - "A" items indicating Soviet-Communist intentions or capabilities
 - "B" important regional developments not necessarily related to Soviet/ Communist intentions or capabilities
 - "C" other information indicating trends and potential developments

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WAN USSR. Unconfirmed Report on Soviet Plans for Invasion of Northern Iran.

reportedly heard that the Soviet army would invade the Northern Iranian provinces about the middle of May. This invasion was to be in conjunction with revolts in Khuzistan and the oil areas. There has been, according to this source, a movement of Soviet troops to reinforce divisions training in Georgia, having as their principal destination the Soviet-Iranian border and the Western shores of the Caspian Sea.

(US Officials Only). COMMENT: Rumors of Soviet plans for inciting the Kurds or actual overt invasion of Northern Iran appear every year at this time during the USSR's annual troop maneuvers near the Iranian border.

While there have been recurrent reports noting a slight increase of Soviet border guards, stepped up patrol activities, and stricter security measures, there is no evidence to date that the USSR is preparing for imminent hostile action against Iran. However, the USSR always maintains sufficient troops in the vicinity of the border to overrun the Northern provinces at any time.

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Soviet Propaganda Reaches New High in Vituperation. A greatly increased tone of violence was noted in Soviet and controlled output during the past 48 hours. The Moscow audience heard another of a series of talks on USinspired atrocities in 1918 when "they (US) organized a counter-revolutionary conspiracy in Siberia. The blood-thirsty tone appeared in Gromyko's violent outburst at the Deputies! parley in Faris, when he referred to Churchill as a "criminal" and described British delegate Davies as one of Churchill's He went on to threaten that "there will not be "cannibalistic advocates." room enough in Korea for white crosses over the graves of interventionist troops if the fighting does not come to an end." Concurrently, Moscow's Far Eastern Service carried vitriolic attacks on Ridgeway, who was pictured as a "beast more frenized and brutal than MacArthur," and on the "murderer," Van Fleet. Another unprecedented scare tactic was evidenced in Red China's broadcast to the Hong Kong audience of the trial of its own purge victims, which not only contained the regular accusations culminating in pronouncement of the death sentence, but also an interlude when the judge, ordering the defendants led through the packed courtroom, exhorted the audience to beat and kick the prisoners. (U NYTimes, 26 Apr 51; U FBIS, 25 Apr 51). COMMENT: This over-all stepped-up hate-US campaign indicates further psychological preparation of Orbital peoples for a possible spread of hostilities, or possible Soviet retributive action, especially in the Far East. The scare themes beamed to Far East audiences appear aimed at herding the Chinese into line with the Communist regime. Gromyko's outbursts, together with the general emphasis on US aggression, sets the stage for a possible breakdown of the Deputy CFM Conference.

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WSSR. Soviet Military Advisers in N. Korea Employ Medical Cover.

Soviet officers attached to North the common combat advisers with Chinese Communist and North Korean units. Two to four officers, in uniforms of the appropriate army medical service, are assigned to each field hospital. In mid-February two such officers were at the North Korean Army field hospital at Namchou.

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direction and guidance may be given. If true, it adds significance to the report that after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from N. Korea in Dec. 48, hospital throughout the area.

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June Announcement of New Five-Year Plan a Possibility. Enactment of the New Plan in June is a real possibility, Embassy Moscow feels, because (1) the Soviet press refers to the Fourth Five-Year Plan as the "first" postwar plan thus implying another plan will follow; (2) the New York Times correspondent heard from a "private source" that the Supreme Soviet will meet in June to enact the fifth Five Year Plan and this story passed the censor. However, the censor has permitted erroneous speculation on other occasions.

of the Embassy also notes that Yashov, "head of the Executive Committee of the Moscow Communist Party," wrote an article for Evening Moscow, 23 Apr 51, in which he referred to the 1951 national economic plan as already enacted by the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Contents of the plan or date of enactment were not mentioned.

COMMENT: Inasmuch as presentation of the Five-Year Plan to the Supreme Soviet is only for the purpose of rubber-stamp approval, it is certain that the top membership of the Council of Ministers would "enact" the Plan first.

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Clue to the Missing 19th Party Congress Supplied by Trieste Party Leader. At the close of the 3rd Congress of the Trieste Party, 11 Feb 51, the Secretary General Vidali, in answer to a question, made some general observations on the frequency with which such Congresses are called. According to him, it is not practice "to go through all the trouble of preparing for a Congress very often. They are held only in exceptional cases, dictated by an international or local situation. Evidently directing himself to his questioner, Vidali continued, "inasmuch as you are interested in the matter you may as well know that the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Communist Party has criticized us for holding Congresses too frequently. On the same occasion, the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party also criticized us because the Italian Party limits itself to a Congress every four or five years only. I consider this criticism justified, but pointed out to them that we work under special circumstances in Trieste and in consequence it was absolutely necessary to hold this Congress." COMMENT: Vidali's statement clearly shows the meaninglessness of Party statutes. Whereas in the USSR, the Party is required to hold a Congress not less than once every three years, the eighteenth and last Congress was in 1939.

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**EASTERN EUROPE. CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Associated Press Correspondent Disappears in Praha. William N. Oatis, Chief of the Associated Press Bureau in Czechoslovakia, disappeared on 23 April in Praha while ostensibly en route to keep an appointment with a Ministry of Information official. The US Emb Praha has been informed by the Deputy Chief of the Press Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Oatis has been arrested and charged with activities hostile to the Czechoslovak state. These charges include the gathering and dissemination of information through illegal news organs.

- HUNGARY. WFDY Headquarters Now Located in Budapest. The official Hungarian news agency announced on 24 April that the headquarters of the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) will henceforth be located in Budapest. (U NYT, 26 Apr 51). COMMENT: The WFDY is one of the Communist international organizations whose headquarters in Paris were closed in recent months by the French Government.
- POLAND. Government Permits American Scantic Line to Continue Operations.

 The representative in Poland of the American Scantic Line has been informed that the Polish Government had unblocked the Line's accounts and had ordered the Gdynia Bank to permit all business transactions by the firm in order to permit its continued operation. A representative of the Polish Ministry of Finance made a special trip from Warsaw to Gdynia to deliver this decision.

 According to the shipping company's representative, the "situation looks better for the Company" and its operations are "practically normal."

COMMENT: After prolonged negotiations, the Polish Government on 20 April levied a special tax of \$31,100 against the American Scantic Line and blocked its accounts in Poland. This action, which followed an official note of 18 April barring American Scantic activities in Poland (see O/CI Daily Digest, 21 Apr 51), would have forced liquidation of the Line's operations. The apparent reason for the Government's reversal of its position probably lies at least partially in the statement of a Ministry of Shipping official to the Line's representative in January that stoppage of American Scantic service to Poland would completely upset the Polish Six Year Plan for maritime activities.

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Poles Demand Strategic Metals From French. US Embassy Paris reports that in the current French-Polish trade negotiations, the Poles have demanded copper, scrap iron, and aluminum, all of which the French have refused to deliver. The Poles have also demanded 200 tons of ferro-molybdenum, and 15 tons of ferro-nickel. The French negotiators feel that unless they agree to the Polish demands, France will lose one million tons of coal constituting eighty percent of Poland's exports to France. The French anticipate having to agree to deliver about 100 tons of ferro-molybdenum and ten tons of ferro-nickel compared to last years agreement to deliver 200 tons and 20 tons respectively of these metals.

COMMENT:
This is another instance of the trade blackmail that Poland is using in its negotiations with Western countries, including Italy, Sweden and Austria, which are hard pressed for coal supplies.

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YUGOSLAVIA. Yugoslavs May Raise Question of Satellite Pressures in UN
This Spring. Yugoslav UN delegate Bebler, upon his return from Belgrade,
has informed Ambassador Austin that increasing tension in the Balkans may
force Yugoslavia in the next month or two to raise the question of
satellite pressures on Yugoslavia in the UN. As a possible preliminary
step to a full-fledged UN discussion, Belgrade has under consideration a
memo for presentation to the UN citing the causes and nature of the tension
provoked by the satellites. Bebler, however, refused to commit himself to
a statement that Yugoslavia considers the situation urgent, insisting that
a request for UN action depends on the growth of satellite pressures.

COMMENT: During his recent interview with

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UN Secretary General Trygve Lie, Tito remarked that border incidents were becoming almost unbearable and that he was giving consideration to bringing the situation before the UN. The recent forthright Yugoslav accusations that the marked increase in satellite provocations are Soviet-directed probably reflect increasing Yugoslav fear that these incidents may be intended to lay the basis for a satellite attack this spring. Another explanation undoubtedly is a Yugoslav desire to justify in the eyes of the Yugoslav people and the Party the Government's request for arms from the West.

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Yugoslavia Favors Regional Peace Observation Committee. Upon instructions from Tito and Kardelj, Yugoslav UN delegate Bebler has explained to Ambassador Austin current Yugoslav thinking regarding a Peace Observation Committee (FOC) for Yugoslavia. Bebler declared that Yugoslavia was resolutely opposed to any military observer group limited to Yugoslavia since it would appear provocative and might create panic in Yugoslavia. He added that Yugoslavia would accept a POC to observe Yugoslav-Satellite borders only if the Satellites agreed to admit such a team. He explained that Belgrade would be more interested in establishing a regional POC to cover a broader area including perhaps Morocco, Berlin, Greece, Turkey and the Arab-Israeli dispute, since such a regional team would be less provocative to the Cominform than an ad hoc POC limited to Yugoslavia. As a third alternative Bebler said Belgrade is also considering having a POC or some other UN body send a diplomatic mission to Belgrade and satellite capitals with a view to examining the causes of tension and attempting conciliation. Bebler thought most highly of a regional POC but believed that a proposal for a team to observe both sides of the Yugoslav satellite borders would be advantageous propagandistically.

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have little immediate prospects for success. Neither Turkey nor Greece can see any necessity for the introduction of such a team within their borders. The UK has expressed the opinion that a regional team might tend to increase world tension.

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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)

Turkish Ambassadors Meeting in Ankara. Foreign Minister Koprulu #BII informed US Ambassador Wadsworth that current discussions with the Turkish Ambassadors from London, Paris, and Rome were being held with a view to crystalizing Turkish foreign policy. The Turkish Ambassador to the US is being instructed to join them in Ankara. Koprulu stated that French Foreign Minister Schuman had assured the Turkish Ambassador in Paris that while in Washington he has almost reached agreement with the US Government on sup-25X1A port of a Mediterranean pact which would include the US, UK, France, Turkey, COMMENT: Undoubtedly the meeting of the Ambassadors is concerned mainly with Turkey's major preoccupation; some type of firm security arrangement with the West which would include the US. Turkish preoccupation with its own security and that of the non-Communist world has been further heightened by recent international developments, such as the disorders in Iran, and the recall of General MacArthur. Currently Turkey may be more hopeful of realizing some security arrangement in view of its firm stand in Korea, and its growing reputation as a non-Communist bastion in the Middle East.

ISRAEL. Reported Leftist Gains in the MAPAM Party. According to a press #A# dispatch of 25 April from Tel Aviv, an extremist group advocating stricter compliance with the Cominform line has gained control of MAPAM, a left-wing socialist party which was second only to MAPAI (Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's party) in the 1949 general elections. In a countrywide election this week of delegates to next month's MAPAM party conference, the extremist group gained about 60% of the delegates. Until this week the extremist group, which maintains that there is no ideological difference between Communist and MAPAM party aims other than Communist opposition to Zionism, had a 50% voice in the party's rule. MAPAM's moderate groups, which have reportedly elected but 40% of the party delegates, have stressed the importance of Zionism and of ideological independence. (U New York Times, Tel Aviv, 26 Apr 51). COMMENT: If the press report is true that MAPAM's forthcoming party conference will be controlled by the extreme left-wing group, the long-rumored split between the extreme left and the moderates of MAPAM may actually develop into an open break. This eventuality could have a startling effect on the general election which Prime Minister Ben-Gurion has scheduled for this summer. A new coalition might well result between the left-wing faction of MAPAM and the Israeli Communist Party (ICP). Such a development could present Israel with a more serious Communist problem than the present political set-up provides. Ben-Gurion's moderate socialist party MAPAI, on the other hand, might win sufficient assistance from the moderate factions of MAPAM to give MAPAI a near majority of the Knesset (parliament) seats. If Ben-Gurion then formed a coalition with the rightist General Zionists, who made impressive gains in last November's municipal elections, the generally pro-West groups in Israel would have a stronger political control of Israel than they now have.

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11 BI INDIA. Congress Party Aware of International Communist Intentions and Propaganda Techniques. It has been previously reported (See OCI Daily Digest, 12 Apr 51) that on 30 March the members of the Indian Congress Party were officially advised by letter to have nothing to do with the current (Communist-inspired) campaign to collect signatures to an appeal advocating a Five Power Peace Pact. At the time of the first report, it was not known whether the letter was issued with the knowledge and approval of Prime Minister Nehru or whether it was independently disseminated by the rightist Congress faction under party President Tandon. It has now been reliably reported that Prime Minister Nehru was present at the committee meeting where the matter was discussed and that he approved the distribution of the advice. US Embassy New Delhi believes 25X1A it had become so clear that the earlier Stockholm Peace Appeal was a Communist maneuver that even Nehru could no longer ignore the fact. COMMENT: It therefore appears that, for the first time, the Congress Party as a whole has taken official cognizance of international Communist intentions and propaganda techniques and has expressed itself as being opposed to them.

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Visit of Indian Scientists to the USSR. On 9 April, a Reuters news release stated that 25 prominent Indians, including Dr. Homi J. Bhabha, Chief of the Atomic Energy Commission, had been invited to visit the USSR during the coming summer. (See OCI Daily Digest, 9 Apr 51). On 21 April, according to Reuters, the Indian Government announced that Dr. S.S. Bhatnagar, Secretary of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Scientific Research, would be unable to accept the invitation because of the pressure of his work. On 22 April, the Delhi radio denied "a recent press report" that Prime Minister Nehru had refused permission for the Indian scientists to visit the USSR, and a press note issued by the Ministry of Natural Resources said that they were free to accept the invitation if their duties did not prohibit it. (R FBID, Far East, 25 Apr 51). COMMENT: In recent months, the Government of India has been increasingly disinclined to promote the exchange of visitors between India and European Communist countries. In spite of the Government's apparent disinterestedness in the matter of the scientists, it is believed that most of the 25 who received the Soviet invitation will find themselves heavily overburdened with work when the time for the visit arrives. 25X1C

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BURMA. Large Chinese Communist Force Reported at Burmese Border.

10,000 Chinese Communist troops moved into the Mengmao area along northeastern Burmese border from Kunming prior to 13 April. The same report states that on 12 April 2400 well-armed Kuomintang troops, under Gen. LI Mi, were preparing to reenter Yunnan from Kengtung State in northeastern Burma some 200 miles southeast of the Mengmao area.

Although there have been several reports of Chinese Communist troop

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deployment on the Burmese border, with the intention of aiding Burmese Reds, and/or containing and eventually destroying Nationalist forces in Burma, this is the first indication of a large-scale concentration. Many conflicting reports on the movements and intentions of Nationalist troops in the Sino-Burma-Thailand border regions have been received over the past several weeks. Those forces in the Kengtung area are estimated to total less than 5000. They are not believed to be capable of a deep or sustained penetration, but the initiation of guerrilla-type forays, incorporating return to Burmese sanctuary, is considered possible.

INDOCHINA. Premier Huu C'aims Good Relations with North Vietnam Catholics.

Premier Huu states that, during his recent visit to the Catholic-dominated provinces of south Tonkin, he received an enthusiastic welcome and that the Catholic prelate-administrators of that region, who had resisted except an enthusiastic velocome and that the Catholic prelate-administrators of that region, who had resisted except an enthusiastic velocome and that authority over them, have now come over unequivocally to the side of the Bac Dai Government.

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COMMENT: The strong-willed Catholic bishops who for some time have been the defacto rulers of a large section of south Tonkin have been wooed by various Vietnamese politicians. During Nguyen Huu Tri's tenure as Governor there was almost constant friction with the Catholics, who sought at the same time to maintain the autonomy of their sector and to cut in on government subsidies. Although Huu's statement that the Catholics resisted Tri's attempts to assert control and although Huu has made the magnanimous gesture of raising a Catholic diocese to the status of province it is very doubtful that the Catholics will support Huu "unequivocally". The bishop of the diocese in question has expressed contempt for Huu—a sentiment which is general in Vietnam—and has compared him unfavorably with ex-Governor Tri.

French Reinforcements Arrive in North Vietnam. The first battalion of the reinforcements which the French Government in March promised that it would send to General De Lattre paraded through the streets of Hanoi last night.

COMMENT: Other units are expected to follow shortly.

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French and Viets Clash Over Minor Issue. An incident which reveals General De Lattre's attitude toward Vietnamese independence is his insistence that he preside over ceremonies inaugurating the new rector of the University at Hanoi. De Lattre dismissed Vietnamese arguments that the University had been turned over to them in accordance with the 8 March Agreements. He stated that Vietnamese independence was still in a "transitional stage" and that meantime he was number one man in Vietnam.

COMMENT: Although this issue is of little significance in itself it is worth noting that General De Lattre feels strongly that in just such a minor affair it is important that France assert its "presence" in Vietnam despite the great demands made on De Lattre by his military responsibilities.

CHINA. CCAF Buildup in South China. A Hong Kong newspaper item of 22 April states (1) the Communists are developing all airfields in Kwangtung province, (2) 160 planes have arrived in Kwangtung, and (3) it is rumored that 300 rore planes will be shipped. (U Navy Hong Kong CTG 50.6, 22 Apr 51).

COMMENT: No reliable count of CCAF planes in South China has been received. The reported figures may be excessive, since no large flights of CCAF aircraft have been reported from that area in the past few months, and 160 aircraft is the current US Air Force estimate of aircraft available to the CCAF in all of China proper. Recent press reports, however, have persistently described the continuing arrival of jets, bombers and other aircraft at Canton, and in February the British estimated that CCAF strength in the Canton area may have reached 120 planes.

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Alleged Disaffection.

and TUNG Ch'i-wu, as a result of their "rebellious attitude," have been sent to the USSR for "special indoctrination," while CHU Teh, due to his "strong nationalistic feelings." is losing power and is "only a figure-head."

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<u>COMMENT</u>: FU and TUNG are one-time Nationalist generals who have been associated with the Peiping regime as "democratic personages"; CHU is C-in-C of Chinese Communist armies; and YEH is Governor of Kwangtung. All have been rumored to be disaffected and as fallen or about to fall from favor. While FU and TUNG probably have no power in the regime, and CHU and YEH may have less than other leaders, there is no evidence of recent changes in their status.

n C n KOREA. ROK National Assembly Charges Misuse of Funds in Draftee Training. The National Assembly's Investigation Committee charged on 25 April that officers of the National Reserve Army, which is somewhat akin to a National Guard, have lined their pockets with 1.5 billion won of army funds. The Committee Chairman charged that: (1) 700,000 soldiers in training camps had been exploited; and (2) malnutrition and sickness in camps, which forced the Government to consider nearly 80% of the draftees as unfit for duty, could have been prevented by a proper use of Government funds. The Committee further charged that maltreatment of trainees "had caused many of the younger generation to plan to betray the Republic." (U UP Ticker labelled "not for report or wire use", 26 Apr 51). COMMENT: While corruption in the South Korean regime is not a recent innovation, it will prove unfortunate in terms of world opinion regarding the ROK if publicity is given to this scandal. The Assembly's charges combined with the probable resignation of Defense Minister SHIN will probably cause a crisis in the ROK Defense Ministry.

"B" <u>JAPAN</u>. <u>Sebald Comments on Local Elections</u>. In reporting on last Monday's local elections, US Polad Sebald states that while next week's gubernatorial elections will indicate more clearly the extent of conservative strength,

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it is his belief that the Socialist defeat was based primarily on the public's rejection of the Socialist peace principles (favoring overall peace, neutrality, no foreign bases) rather than being a blanket endorsement of the Conservative parties. Sebald adds that Dulles' presence in Japan and his press conference of 19 April probably had a damaging effect on the Socialist campaign, and his speech of 23 April may further undermine the Socialist Party's position.

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COMMENT: Socialist Party leaders, as well as most of the Japanese press agree that Ambassador Dulles! return and subsequent remarks were a major factor in the Socialist defeat. It is probable, however, that with the long-desired peace treaty now imminent, the Japanese people were ready to reject any platform which would have prolonged the Occupation.

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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)



"A" FRANCE. Communists Infiltrate French Communications System.

the French Communist Party (PCF) has liberally infiltrated with militant Communist agents all posts of the nationalized postal, telephone and telegraph services (PTT) where information can be gathered concerning international communications. Cells of the PCF Pyrenees network have recently rechecked the list of their members and ordered careful examination of all trans-Pyrenees communications. COMMENT: Communist infiltration in French communication facilities has probably not changed appreciably in the past year, although PCF influence in this field was reported recently in connection with alleged PCF control of the management of the French Broadcasting System. PCF reassessment of its capabilities along the Spanish border may be the result of recent indications of a decided drop in Communist strength in that area. According to a recent report, Belgian Communists have seriously interfered with postal deliveries between Belgian soldiers in Korea and the homeland.

UNITED KINGDOM. Labor Rank-and-File Reaction to Bevan Resignation
Still Unclear. US Embassy London reports that at the 25 April
meeting of the Labor Party's National Executive Committee at which
only three members out of a total membership of 24 supported former
Labor Minister Bevan's position on the budget and defense expenditures,

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Bevan himself was much more moderate in presenting his case than in his previous statements to the House of Commons and the Parliamentary Labor Party. The Embassy attributes this to Bevan's awareness that very few Labor Party members approve of his tactics. Concurrently, British trade union leadership, by a large majority vote of the General Council of the Trades Union Congress has reaffirmed its support of Government policy. U NY Times, 26 Apr 51). COMMENT: Although it is now evident that Bevan can at present command little support either among Labor MPs or in the top leadership of the trade unions, it is to be noted that (1) no clear evidence has yet appeared as to the reactions of Labor's rank-and-file, (2) Bevan's elections in years past to the National Executive Committee have been by very heavy votes, and (3) there is abundant other evidence of rank-and-file concern over civilian living standards being sacrificed to rearmament. If Bevan can avoid being labeled by the rank-and-file as a traitor to the party as a whole, he will be in a position to raise this potent issue again later

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GUATEMALA. Rail Strike Tests Labor Sympathies of New Administration. The US Embassy in Guatemala reports that, according to Thomas Bradshaw (president of the US-owned International Railways of Central America), no progress is being made toward a settlement of the railway workers' strike, which has paralyzed the entire railway system.

comment: The underlying purpose of the strike, which began on 19 April, is generally considered to be that of forcing the new Arbenz administration to commit itself on its labor policy. Although Arbenz relied heavily on the aggressive, militant, railway workers' union during his election campaign, he has also given the impression that he will follow a less antagonistic course toward US business interests than did his predecessor, Arevalo. In view of the serious disruption caused by the strike, the Government may be forced to intervene pending a settlement. The political considerations involved, however, suggest that a final settlement may be delayed for some time.

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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)

TRAN. President Truman Offers the Services of his physician to the Shah. President Truman has offered the services of his personal physician, Major General Graham, to the Shah who has been suffering from appendicitis.

COMMENT: The Shah has been reluctant to leave Iran for medical treatment during the current unsettled situation in Iran. President Truman's offer, if accepted, should provide an added opportunity for improving US-Iranian relations. The Shah, however, may be considering employing European 25X1X physicians.



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